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ABSTRACT
Conducting weapons test in the U.S. Navy’s Point Mugu Sea Test Range requires
clearing a hazard pattern using aircraft equipped with surface search radar to ensure that
inert debris from a weapons system test does no t impact non participating vessels or
personnel. This mission is referred to as range surveillance and clearance.
The purpose of this thesis is to discuss a standardized method that objectively
validates an aircraft for use as a range surveillance and clearance asset. The goal is for the
method to be cost effective, easily repeatable, adaptable to as many different types of
airborne assets as possible, and one which provides the range authorities a high
confidence and defendable method to accept an aircraft as suitable for the mission.
The proposed method was created from a study of range clearance procedures and
requirements. The study included review of directly applicable and analogous test
instructions and interviews with range safety personnel, subject matter experts on radar,
and experienced mission operators (aircrew and surface surveillance). The method was
also based on the author’s experience as project officer responsible for testing an aircraft
for this mission.
The investigation led to the creation of a list of objective requirements, primarily
found in current instructions. An organizational process was then defined with the
purpose of providing a structure by which roles and responsibilities are assigned, as well
as to delineate the final approval authority for the process. Next, a method was developed
that uses information gathered about the aircraft under consideration and compares it
against the requirements through a preliminary review. This review consists of a
computer simulation of expected radar performance and a comparison of basic aircraft
performance and capabilities such as range, endurance and speed. Once the preliminary
review is complete, the aircraft is evaluated during a ground systems preflight check and
a flight test. These evaluations are designed to provide qualitative and quantitative data
that can be analyzed to determine if the aircraft under consideration meets the established
requirements. Lastly, a method for determining the degree to which the test aircraft met
the requirements is presented. This method is explained using available historical data
iv

from a flight test report which evaluated a C-130 aircraft configured with AN/APS-115
surface search radar for the range surveillance and clearance mission.
The findings of this study indicate that it is possible to develop a generic method
for validation that would give the Range Commander a high confidence that aircraft
utilized in this mission are suitable for the tasks required. Although many of the test
instructions consulted and the author’s experience were primarily related to the Point
Mugu Sea Test Range, the results of this thesis could be applied to any test range
requiring the use of a range surveillance and clearance aircraft.

v

PREFACE
The intention of this thesis is to explore the possibility for providing a
standardized method for future requirements. Although Department of Defense
publications and instructions were used as a basis for analysis, the conclusions presented
are solely the opinion of the author and in no way reflect Navy or national range policy.
All material presented is Unclassified.
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
Background
Testing weapons is an inherently hazardous activity that requires careful planning
and meticulous coordination to ensure a safe operation. Of particular concern to the Navy
is avoiding a mishap with non-participating civilian personal or equipment. Besides the
initial damage, a mishap of this kind could have far reaching public relation implications
and possibly cause the cancellation of a weapons program. One only need examine the
recent mishap where a U.S. submarine collided with a civilian Japanese vessel to realize
the impact an incident of this kind can have on human life and to a lesser extent, the
image of the Navy. 1
One method the Navy uses to avoid this type of mishap is to use a radar equipped
aircraft to conduct surface search to ensure that non participants are clear prior to
declaring a “green range ” (range is ready for test). Working in coordination with a range
surveillance control facility, the aircraft conducts sweeps and determines course and
speed of contacts. If a contact will potentially enter, or “foul”, the range during test, the
surveillance aircraft may be directed to fly over the vessel and contact it via radio to
attempt to resolve the conflict. This mission is referred to as range surveillance and
clearance.

Mission Description
The Point Mugu Sea Test Range, as presented in Figure 1, is a large complex
projecting out from the Naval Air Station Point Mugu and covering 36,000 miles2 .
Although the vast size of the area provides the Range Commander (RC) with opportunity
for isolating non participants from inert debris; it also presents a formidable problem in
terms of monitoring test areas.

1

Thomas E. Ricks and Paul Arnett,” U.S. Sub and Japanese Boat Collide,” Washington Post, 10 February
2001, sec. A, p.1.
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Figure 1. Point Mugu Sea Test Range 2
The task is made easier when a smaller test area is defined by the type of test involved.
When a test mission is proposed that would present an inert debris hazard, the
Range Commander is responsible to ensure the safety of the test within acceptable limits.
The Range Commander’s Council Standard 321-02, and its supplement provide a
“common set of debris protection policies, risk criteria, and guidelines to protect
personnel and assets during manned and unmanned flight operations.” 3 The common
policies proposed by this directive step through an analysis that define what type of
debris could be generated from various weapons tests, where it would propagate, how
lethal the debris would be on impact, and the probability of risk to personnel and assets.

2

Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division Code 5200D, “Functional Requirements for Sea Range Air
and Sea Surveillance and Air Intercept Control,” Data Repository Group Office DRGO-6255-9982, 21 June
2004, 1.
3
Range Commanders Council, “Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges,” Standard 321-02, June
2002, 1-1.
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The overall safety standard is written such that the risk exposure probability to an
individual is not more than 1 x 10-6 on an annual basis. 4
To more thoroughly understand the range safety process, one must consider a
notional scenario of an airborne weapon system test launch. The range safety office
would analyze the test scenario to determine a debris hazard pattern as shown in Figure 2.
The small solid box represents the area that could potentially be affected by debris at the
weapon launch point. Because the pattern could be oriented in any direction depending
on the circumstances at the time of launch, the hazard pattern is typically defined by a
circle. The size of the circle is calculated by the maximum distance that the weapon can
travel and the probabilistic distribution of debris with margins included to account for

Center of Potential Debris Field Circle

Center of Launch Box

Search Box

Figure 2. Example of Debris Propagation and Associated Hazard Pattern5

4

Ibid, 3-1.
Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, “Range Safety Approval for ASRAAM Weapon Separation
Test at Atlantic Offshore Warning Area W-386,” 26 April 2001, Appendix B.
5

3

error. As the weapon travels away from the launch box, the area that could potentially be
affected by debris expands because directional errors induced by system problems or
external variables such as winds are exacerbated over distance. For exa mple, a 5 degree
launch heading error would cause a weapon to be off course only approximately 1/12th of
a mile after traveling 1 mile. But that same error would result in more than a 2 and 1/2
mile error if the weapon traveled 30 miles. Once the hazard pattern is determined, a
search pattern defined by a square whose sides are equal to the diameter of the hazard
pattern is assigned to provide a simple search box for clearing.
With the above understanding of the bounded scope of the mission the Range
Commander attempts to avoid a mishap by ensuring that calculations are done correctly
to keep debris within the search area and that the area is properly monitored to ensure that
non participants are outside of the search area. The airborne range surveillance asset is
often relied upon in accomplishing the latter task and therefore range authorities should
have a high confidence in its capability to perform the mission. The criteria for an aircraft
to perform the range surveillance mission are based on its ability to fully support these
range safety requirements.

Problem Statement
The Navy’s Point Mugu Sea Test Range has historically utilized P-3 variant
aircraft to perform the range surveillance and clearance mission. However, due to
airframe attrition the Range has been forced to consider alternatives, both military owned
and civilian commercial contract aircraft. As one alternative, the Naval Air System
Command (NAVAIR) executive leadership team (ELT) directed modification of two C130 aircraft with AN/APS-115 surface search radars as a recapitalization effort for future
range support.

6

As project officer for this effort, the author discovered that the Point Mugu Sea
Test Range lacked clear instructions, methods, procedures and processes to confidently
accept a newly proposed aircraft for use in the range surveillance and clearance mission.

6

Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, “KC-130 Range Surveillance and Clearance Mission APS115 Flight Test Program,” Test Plan Number P2005-08-569AO, 19 Aug 2005, 1.
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The Functional Requirements for Sea Range Air and Sea Surface Surveillance and Air
Intercept Control document passively states that verification should be done, and
synoptically describes the methods that may be used to validate an asset. 7 However, it is
inadequate to determine what must be accomplished.
A barrier to creating a single standard has been reluctance by range safety and
operations authorities to sanction aircraft without fully investigating all of the potential
variables. This is not practical to achieve because of the excessive number of data points
required to characterize every potential variable such as target type, environmental
conditions, and angle of reflection. This reluctance has resulted in the more undesirable
situation of no existent standard.

Proposed Solution
It is possible to provide a qualitative and quantitative decision making tool to the
Range Commander. The standard by which the Range Commander’s Council (RCC)
judges the risk of inert debris can logically be applied to any safety mechanism on the
range such as range surveillance aircraft. “The intent of the safety criteria is to provide
definitive, measurable, numerical criteria to protect people….Definitive criteria provide a
standard by which the RC’s [Range Commander’s] actions can be compared to those of
any reasonable person in similar circumstances.”8 Following this less stringent yet
definable goal, a method can be developed which validates an aircraft within an
achievable test schedule and budget while still producing a high confidence result.
Furthermore, the method, once developed, can be improved over time if deficiencies in
testing become apparent.
This thesis will develop a list of requirements that an aircraft must be able to
comply with to adequately perform the range surveillance and clearance mission. These
requirements will be developed from an investigation of existing range instructions as
well as from the author’s mission experience. An organizational process will be proposed
that defines the roles and responsibilities of personnel associated with, and approval
7

“Functional Requirements for Sea Range Air and Sea Surveillance and Air Intercept Control,” 2.
Range Commanders Council, “Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges”, Supplement to Standard
321-02, June 2002, 1-1.
8
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authorities for, validating a proposed aircraft. Next, a method will be developed that will
be designed to be useful with any generic aircraft. Utilizing the method will produce data
which may be analyzed and compared against the requirements. This analysis can then be
condensed into a report which can be reviewed, approved, and archived for later use.
Lastly an explana tion of the process for assessing the degree to which the aircraft met the
requirements will be presented.

6

CHAPTER II. REQUIREMENTS
To create a viable test method, the capabilities of an aircraft and radar system
must be understood. This chapter will review the current instructions used to determine
mission requirements. Additionally, the rationale for a newly established requirement is
explained. Lastly, the product of the requirements is presented in the form of a
capabilities requirement matrix (CRM) from which the test method is determined.

Currently Defined Requirements
Two sources were used as a basis for defining the new proposed requirements.
The first source was the Capabilities Requirement Document (CRD) for the NC-130F
Range Support Aircraft 138319 9 . The CRD is a document that describes the objectives
and minimum requirements for the C-130 aircraft to be considered acceptable for its
various missions including range surveillance and clearance. The document was signed
by NAVAIR Range Department, Associate Department Head for Pacific Range and
therefore it will be assumed that the requirements specified for that mission were at the
least minimally acceptable to the Point Mugu Sea Test Range authorities.
The second document is the Functional Requirements for Sea Range Air and Sea
Surface Surveillance and Air Intercept Control which “establishes functional
requirements for air surveillance, sea surface surveillance, and Air Intercept Control
(AIC) at the Sea Range.”10 The document contains airborne surveillance quantitative
radar performance characteristics which are considered to be minimum acceptable
requirements. The parameters drawn from this instruction for incorporation as test criteria
for this thesis were the most stringent requirements fo r the Sea Range outside of the Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which excludes radar cross sections (RCS) less than
3 m2 . Smaller targets such as kayaks are discounted due to fact that they are considered
unlikely to venture outside five nautical miles (nm) from shore where research
development test and evaluation (RDT&E) events normally occur.
9

Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, “Capability Requirements Document for the NC-130F
Range Support Aircraft (RSA) 138319,” 13 January 2005, A-2.
10
“Functional Requirements for Sea Range Air and Sea Surveillance and Air Intercept Control,” 4-5.
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Proposed New Requirement
A new requirement is proposed adding to those drawn from the existing
instructions in order to ensure that the aircraft tested will be fully capable of performing
the range surveillance and clearance mission. This requirement is a minimum cruise
airspeed (Vc) selected to meet the minimum time to clear 20,000 miles2 (3 hours), and to
be capable of visual identification (VID). Without a minimum airspeed a dirigible could
conceivably meet all of the technical and endurance parameters as well as visually
identify targets, however, it could never prosecute a contact in a timely manner in order
to continue with test. A Vc of 150 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) is a value which was
determined using the following rationale : 20,000 miles2 could be represented by a box of
approximately 142 nm sides as represented in Figure 3.
Assuming this notional clearance area, an aircraft located in the center would
have 100 nm to travel to any corner of the square. A Vc of 150 KIAS, no wind, would
allow the aircraft to VID a target at the corners within 45 minutes of tasking. Adding this

˜100 nm

˜142 nm

Figure 3. Notional Clearance Area Representing 20,000 miles2

8

time to the time to perform two full sweeps of the notional clearance area exceeds the 3
hour clearance requirement by approximately 30 minutes but is considered acceptable as
a minimum requirement.

Capabilities Requirements Matrix
A Capabilities Requirements Matrix (CRM) was developed by collating the
proposed new minimum cruise speed requirement with the currently defined
requirements. The CRM is needed to organize the critical requirements of the range
surveillance and clearance mission into one source. The items were incorporated based
on the author’s experience with the mission and included all of the range surveillance and
clearance requirements of the CRD. Selected requirements were drawn from the
Functional Requirements for Sea Range Air and Sea Surface Surveillance and Air
Intercept Control11 in order to fully define the aircraft and radar capabilities for the
proposed method. Items from this document that were excluded from the CRM were
either redundant or not critical for validation purposes.
The CRM is the acceptance criteria that will have to be satisfied by any flight
asset that may be evaluated for this mission. Two types of capabilities are represented in
the matrix. The first being aircraft capabilities. Because the radar resides as part of a
system in an airframe it is essentially useless unless the aircraft can meet minimum
requirements such as endurance, navigation, communications, etc. The second type
focuses on the technical aspects of the radar itself. These criteria will define aspects such
as maximum range, track capability etc. The CRM is presented in Table 1 and is color
coded to indicate the source from which the requirement is drawn.

11

Ibid.

9

CRD 138319
DRGO-6255-9982

Table 1. Capabilities Requirements Matrix
Parameter

New Requirement
Requirement

Aircraft Requirements
1

Endurance

Provide clearing activities with single or multiple units for seven hours at 150 NM from test and
evaluation base.

2

Cruise Airspeed (Vc)

Capable of maintaining at least 150 KIAS

3

Search Speed

Surveillance of 20,000 miles 2 area, at 150 nm from nearest airfield, within three hours

4

Navigation

Identify hazard area boundaries with ±0.5 nm accuracy

5

Communications

Range control has connectivity with surveillance asset throughout test and evaluation event

6

Communications

Provide VHF/FM radio communication capability with surface contact

7

General

Provide visual identification (VID) of surface contacts by reading vessel name
Radar Requirements

8

Radar Detection

3 m2 RCS represented by 20 ft sailboat or 18 ft Boston whaler

9

Radar Detection

Radar surface detection of 3 m2 RCS target with 90% 1st pass probability of detection (POD)

10

Target Accuracy

Identify surface contact within ±0.5 nm accuracy

11

Radar Processing

Determine target course (true, relative) to ±5 degrees

12

Radar Processing

Determine target speed to ±3 knots

13

Radar Processing

Label and maintain multiple contacts

14

Weather/Surface Conditions

Effective in VMC/IMC with surface winds to 25 knots, Sea State 4

10

CHAPTER III. PROPOSED VALIDATION METHOD
The method proposed is intended to produce a high confidence result in one
logical, standardized, and cost effective (in terms of schedule, manpower, as well as
actual funds expended) method. In applying this method, a candidate aircraft will be
analyzed using computer modeling and mathematical comparison, ground and flight
testing, all with the goal of evaluating performance versus the specific capabilities
requirements from the CRM. The method will determine if the candidate aircraft meets
the acceptance criteria for use as a range surveillance and clearance mission asset. The
results of the validation test will be compiled in a report and are reviewed and approved
by range authorities. The report is then archived so that it may be updated or referenced
as required. A process for administering the proposed validation method is described that
takes into account the existing organizational and command structure relating to range
surveillance and clearance.

Process to Validate Proposed Aircraft
The process to approve an aircraft for the range surveillance and clearance
mission must culminate in an approval at the proper level of authority. With that goal,
this thesis proposes that an instruction should be created which delineates the
requirements for, and the process to approve, a range surveillance aircraft. The Naval Air
System Commands Range Department (NAVAIR 5.2) is the organization within
NAVAIR which is responsible for managing the “the resources required to operate and
sustain all NAVAIR ranges by providing safe, instrumented, controlled testing…”12 and
therefore is the logical approval authority for the proposed instruction. Figure 4 presents
the organizational structure of NAVAIR 5.2 as it relates to the execution of the proposed
instruction.

12

Naval Air Systems Command Instruction 5400.1C,”Naval Aviation Systems Team Organizational

Manual,” 7 August 2000 (Draft Revision).
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Range Department
Department Head (5.2)

Associate Department Head for
Atlantic Range

Associate Department Head for
Pacific Range

Atlantic Range Ops. Division
Deputy 5.2.2

Pacific Range Ops. Division
Deputy 5.2.3

Range Safety Team
5.2.2G

Range Safety Branch
5.2.3.3D

Figure 4. NAVAIR 5.2 Organizational Structure 13
The instruction should delegate the specific approval authority for range
surveillance and clearance assets to the Atlantic and Pacific Range Associate Department
Heads. The Associate Department Heads provide the leadership and policy guidance for
their specific area of responsibility.
The Range Operation Division Heads are charged with safely conducting all
operations on their respective ranges and as such shall be responsible for executing the
validation testing of candidate range surveillance and clearance aircraft. When an aircraft
is proposed for the mission, the Range Operations Division head will assign a project test
engineer from the division to administer the validation method. The project test engineer
will be responsible for the following items which will each be explained in subsequent
paragraphs. First, the project test engineer will collect specific aircraft and radar data
from the custodian of the proposed aircraft via an input data sheet. The project test
engineer is also responsible to ensure the data comes from reliable reference material
(e.g. Naval Aviation Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS)).
Next, using the input data, the project test engineer will conduct a preliminary CRM
13

Ibid.

12

comparison to determine suitability of the candidate aircraft and radar versus the critical
requirements. The project test engineer will then schedule a flight test event including
coordinating the availability of the test facilities, target boat, and range area required for
completion. Lastly, the project test engineer will collate and ana lyze the data and provide
a recommendation through a report of validation test results. The report will be routed
through the Range Safety office and Range Operations Division Head, each of which can
add recommendations if required. Finally, the Associate Range Department Head will
review and either approve or reject the aircraft as a suitable asset.

Preliminary CRM Comparison
The expected suitability of the proposed system, both for the radar and the
aircraft, can be evaluated prior to flight test by using computer simulations and
mathematical comparisons based upon available manufacturers specifications. This is a
favorable approach in that it is cost effective, standardized, and can serve to exclude
specific aircraft, radars, or systems without having to invest the manpower or budget for
actual test. Also, since it would be impossible to flight test every variable such as target
size, sea state, etc., this preliminary comparison provides an expeditious means of
assessing a candidate aircraft against a broad range of conditions that help to define flight
test requirements. The flight test can then be designed to selective ly validate points of
interest. Lastly, performing a preliminary CRM comparison of the aircraft and radar
provides an historical catalogue which can be used to refine future tests, and a means for
comparing future proposed range surveillance assets. Following the form of the CRM, the
comparison assesses the candidate aircraft and radar as an integrated system, and as
separate components of the system.

Input Data Sheet
A data sheet will be used as the basis to conduct the preliminary CRM
comparison of the aircraft and radar performance as compared to those in the CRM. The
input data sheet was created from the author’s experience and was designed to provide
13

information essential to understanding the expected performance of the aircraft or radar.
The data sheet will be completed by a representative of the organization which owns the
aircraft that is being considered. The information presented is derived from aircraft
publications and manufacturers’ specifications. The proposed data sheet is divided into
general information, aircraft specific data and radar specific data and is presented in
Figure 5.

Aircraft (data sheet items 6-16)
The data provided in these items are a qualitative and quantitative look that assists
the project test engineer in formally documenting the aircraft under consideration.
Questions that occur as a result of the submission can be addressed by control and item
number of the data sheet. For example if the VHF frequency range (item 13) submitted
did not cover marine frequency, the proposing agency could be queried to determine if
they can easily augment their aircraft to add this capability. If the answer is no, then the
proposal is rejected and no further energy is expended on it.

Radar(data sheet items 17-28)
These data are required by the advanced refractive effects prediction system
(AREPS). AREPS is a model developed by the Space and Naval Warfare Center which
provides a powerful tool for predicting many types of electronic propagation, including
radar. The program can accept multiple radar and target types and can be configured to
display range and probability of detection14 . The data required can be obtained through a
database maintained by the Space and Naval Warfare Center or can be obtained from
manufacturers’ specifications and entered manually. Although there are many models
which may be used to predict radar system performance, AREPS is the most logical to
use in this application because it was developed by a Naval resource, it can be used free
of charge, and is a simple application that runs on Windows® based desktop computers.

14

Wayne L. Patterson, “Advanced Refractive Effects Prediction System,” Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Center.
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Range Surveillance and Clearance Aircraft
Data Sheet
1.Date of Request

2.FOR RANGE ADMIN USE ONLY
CONTROL NUMBER

3.Proposing Agency

4.Point of Contact

5. Contact Phone/email

AIRCRAFT DATA
6.Aircraft Type

7.Endurance
(HR:MIN)

11.Navigation Source (circle all that
apply)
VOR

TACAN

INS

8.M ax Range (NM)

9.Vne

10.Vc (or search
speed if different)

12.UHF Frequency
Range

13.VHF Frequency
Range

14. Can aircraft
accommodate a
passenger/evaluator
for test flight? Y/N

GPS

Other:
15 Cost Per Flight Hour

16. Briefly Describe Visual Identification Method:

RADAR DATA (1)
17.Radar type/model number

18.Frequency(MHz)

19. Peak
Power(kW)

20. Pulse Length(µs)

21. Receiver noise figure(dB)

22.Assumed System
Loss (dB)

23.Max
instrumented
range(nmi)

24.Pulse rate(Hz)

25. Antenna Gain(dBi)

26. Antenna scan
rate

27. Horizontal
Beam Width

28. Vertical Beam
Width

Note (1): RADAR input data derived from AREPS inputs, other programs may require additional/different data

Figure 5. Proposed Aircraft Data Sheet
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Analysis of Radar Data
With the inp uts from data sheet items 17 through 28, AREPS can create a graph
as presented in Figure 6. The example presented predicts the probability of an airborne
early warning aircraft flying at 5,000 ft detecting a 10m2 RCS surface target.
The colored dashed horizontal lines are a reference extension of the POD
percentages described by the vertical axis. The thin black line describes the predicted
probability of detection (POD) by the example radar as a function of range. The free
space reference red line is an indication of the best performance that could be expected of
the example radar if there were no propagation loss. From this depiction we would expect
this radar to effectively detect the selected target from approximately 10 nm to a distance
slightly greater than 45 nm.
The above graph will be reproduced for a small sized surface target (3 m2 RCS) as
defined by the functional requirements document 15 The maximum range predicted by the
AREPS model will be used to determine maximum range flight test distances.

Predicted POD vs Range

Figure 6. AREPS Probability of Detection (POD) versus Range 16

15
16

“Functional Requirements for Sea Range Air and Sea Surveillance and Air Intercept Control,” 4-5.
Source AREPS version 3.6.01.45 08 May 2006, used by permission
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Preflight Systems Check
A comprehensive functional ground test of the radar is beyond the scope of the
validation flight in that it would require an extensive budget to produce adequate data for
comparison. There is a need, however, to expand the routine preflight of a candidate
aircraft before a test flight. The purpose is to ensure that critical aircraft systems, which
include communication, navigation, and radar systems are all operating within
specification. Specific system deficiencies can be noted and if needed the flight test can
be dela yed or rescheduled until the degradations can be corrected Specifically the
preflight systems check at a minimum should verify the following:
•

Communications (UHF, VHF/FM)

•

Radar system Built in Tests (BIT)

•

Functionality of radar operating modes.

Additionally, if an evaluator will be accompanying the proposed aircraft during test, an
expanded preflight check is an opportunity to familiarize the evaluator with the system
functions that will be observed. A proposed preflight systems check card is presented in
appendix A, Figure 15.

Flight Test
Available Test Facilities/Equipment
Range Surveillance and Control (RSC)
The Point Mugu Sea Test Range employs a division of personnel with expertise in
coordinating and controlling the range through tracking air and surface targets with land
based air search and surface search radars. These RSC capabilities can be used during a
validation test event to log aircraft position versus contact position. Range and bearings
called out by aircraft can be verified in post mission analysis to ensure accuracy. On each
mission, an RSC individual is stationed as a “surface tracker”. The surface tracker logs all
contacts on a paper surface plot by time, position, and course and speed relative to the

17

hazard pattern. 17 During any test event, the RSC surface trackers mark radar contacts
prior to test and utilize the Advanced Combat Direction System (ACDS) to follow them
as they move in relation to the range area which must remain clear. Surface craft that
have the potential to foul the range can be identified prior to test events as contacts of
interest.

High Speed Maneuverable Seaborne Target (HSMST)
A High Speed Maneuverable Seaborne Target (HSMST), as depicted in Figure 7,
available through the NAVAIR seaborne targets engineering branch, Port Hueneme,
California, is highly desirable for use during test. The HSMST is a rigid inflatable boat
with an aluminum hull and has previously been considered by range authorities to be
comparable with the smallest type of craft that would be encountered on the Point Mugu
Sea Test Range. 18 The HSMST has GPS and navigational equipment onboard that can
record its own position versus clock time for the entire test period which can be used to
correlate target position data in post mission analysis.
Additionally, the HSMST has been characterized in an anechoic chamber and
therefore provides a known target RCS for evaluating a potential radar system. Figure 8
is a depiction of the composite RCS signature for radar frequencies from 8 to 12
Gigahertz (GHz). The composite signature graph gives an approximation of the type of
radar return the HSMST produces at various aspects, with 0 degrees representing directly
bow on, and 180 degrees representing the stern. The signature is reported on the vertical
axis in RCS decibels m2 (dBsm). For comparison, a 3 m2 RCS return is represented by
approximately 4.78 dBsm.
As demonstrated in Figure 8, the HSMST’s radar cross section varies greatly from
less than 3 m2 RCS in the bow region to greater than 100 m2 RCS when painted directly

17

Naval Air Systems Command Weapons Division, Point Mugu, “Policy for Sea Range Surveillance and
Clearance”, 20 February 2003 (DRAFT), 9.
18
Leonard Hartsook, “Test Plan for the AIRTEC King Air A100 Airborne Surveillance Radar OP Number
SR14646,” 26 Apr 2004.2.
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Figure 7. High Speed Maneuverable Seaborne Targe t (HSMST) 19

Figure 8. Composite RCS Signature 8-12 GHz20
19

Leonard Hartsook, “Report on the AirTec King Air A100 and its AN/APS-143 Airborne Surveillance
Radar Test,” 27 Apr 2004.6.
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abeam. Therefore, the flight test procedures should consider the aspect of the HSMST to
ensure the target is presented in the lower RCS regions.

Proposed Test Mission Profile
A standard test profile was created to address all 15 items of the CRM either
directly or through extrapolation. Although the goal is to validate each requirement with a
high degree of certainty, the test should be limited to account for the following natural
constraints. First, in keeping with the goals of this thesis, the proposed method is not
intended to be a developmental test of a radar system but rather a validatio n to provide
confidence to the Range Commander that the asset suitably performs the mission.
Therefore to be of practical use, efficient use of time is essential so that the total cost to
test is limited appropriately for the intended scope. Secondly, the Point Mugu Sea Test
Range is heavily scheduled and therefore, allotting time to perform test validation flights
must consider the affects on the limited resources of the range and not conflict with other
weapon system testing. Therefore, the profile’s test hazard pattern was designed to be
small enough to fit in multiple areas of the range, thereby making it possible to
simultaneously conduct test operations in one area while performing the validation test in
another.
The proposed test will be performed in two parts. Part I will validate the aircraft’s
autonomous detection capability and Part II will focus on specific mission related
functions while under positive control. General flight data will be recorded during both
stages to verify aircraft performance. Verification is determined by comparing the data
collected with the CRM as it applies to each test part. Tables are provided that explain the
elements of test as they relate to each item of the CRM.

Part I, Autonomous Search
During this stage the HSMST will be stationed inside a specified search square
with 40 nm sides, but its location will be undisclosed to the test flight crew. The test
20

Naval Air Warfare Center Radar Reflectivity Laboratory, “Radar Cross-Section Measurements of the
MBAR Rib Target Boat,” 4 January 1999.
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aircraft will launch, self navigate to the search area (location defined in the test mission
brief), and perform a parallel track search as depicted in Figure 9. The search altitude will
be 5,000 ft MSL which is based on the typical altitude assigned by the range for aircraft
performing this mission.
The parallel track search is a search method designed to produce an evenly
distributed search of a known area. 21 The sweep width of this test will be fixed at 20 nm
in order to standardize the profile. While sweeping the area the radar operator will
develop a surface plot of all targets detected by the radar. The surface plot is a record of
the number of radar contacts, contacts course and speed, and contact positions. Radar
contacts will be designated and relayed to the range control facility. If necessary to
complete the surface plot, the aircraft may perform up to two full sweeps of the area.
Once all of the radar contacts detected by the aircraft have been designated, and
characterized in terms of position, course, and speed, Part I is complete.

40 nm

Search Area

Parallel Track
Test
Airfield
Track Space

Figure 9. Depiction of Flight Test Part I, Autonomous Search

21

Search Theory and Applications, K. Brian Haley and Lawrence D. Stone, NATO Conference Series
Series II, Volume 8, New York, Plenum Press, 1980, 55.
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Analysis of Part I Flight Test Data
The test card for recording data from Part I is presented in appendix A, Figure 16.
Table 2 describes the relation between the data gathered from the Part I test and specific
items of the CRM for validation.

Part II, Directed Search
During Part II, range surveillance will disclose which of the identified contacts
the HSMST is; if not previously detected then range surveillance will disclose the
HSMST’s location. Range surveillance will then direct the test aircraft to a distance 10
nm outside of AREPS predicted maximum detection range (not to exceed 60 nm) from
the HSMST. Once in position, range surveillance will direct the HSMST to maintain a
heading which presents a 30 to 60 degree aspect to the test aircraft. This aspect should
provide a radar return signature on the order of 3 m2 RCS.
The test aircraft will then be vectored directly toward the HSMST. The radar
operator in the test aircraft will record and report to range surveillance first radar contact,

Table 2. Validation of Part I Data versus CRM
CRM
#
4

5
8
9
10-13
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Data Compared from Part I with CRM Item for Validation
The degree of accuracy that the test aircraft autonomously navigates to
search box and through test pattern can be directly compared against the
±0.5 NM required by this CRM item.
Test aircraft will maintain radio communication with range surveillance
during the entire test period. Any loss of communications will be noted.
Accurately detecting the HSMST in the first sweep will favorably compare
the test aircraft against this CRM item.
Same as above
In building surface plot, the radar operator of the test aircraft will designate
multiple radar contacts and report contact location (range bearing, latitude
and longitude if system supports) and the contact course and speed. The
evaluator can correlate these reports during test with the RSC’s surface
picture as well as post test with the HSMST’s GPS data recording.
Radar performance will be validated up to wind/sea state conditions on day
of test
22

first continuous hold, and loss of contact at minimum range. If the test aircraft is unable
to detect the target, the RSC will direct the HSMST to turn to present a stern aspect to the
test aircraft to increase its radar signature. Once the HSMST is steady on new heading the
RSC will reposition the test aircraft outside maximum detection distance and
recommence the test run.
As the aircraft closes to within 10 nm of the HSMST, range surveillance will
direct the aircraft under test to establish radio contact with the HSMST on marine
VHF/FM channel 16. Once communications are established on channel 16, the test
aircraft will direct a channel change to VHF/FM channel 8 and reestablish and confirm
acceptable communications on both frequencies. If more time is necessary to complete
the communications test, the test aircraft will be directed to orbit within 10 nm of the
HSMST.
The test aircraft will then be directed by range surveillance to descend under
visual meteorological conditions (VMC) to VID a target of opportunity. It is preferable
that a target of opportunity from the Part I flight test be used. The purpose is to
demonstrate the test crew’s ability to identify a previously unknown target. However if
one is unavailable the aircraft should be re-directed to find the HSMST. Once the
selected target is visually identified, the crew will record and report the vessel’s name,
and perform a surface vessel identification in accordance with the Navy Search and
Rescue Tactical Information Document (SAR TACAID) manual. 22 . The general flow of
the Part II test is presented in Figure 10 with the numbers representing the sequence of
actions taking place.

Analysis of Part II Flight Test Data
The test card for recording data from Part II is presented in appendix A, Figure
17. As is Part I, Table 3 describes the relation between the data gathered from the Part II
test and specific items of the CRM for validation.
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Naval Air Systems Command, Navy Search and Rescue Tactical Information Document (SAR TACAID),
NAVAIR A1-SARBA-TAC-00, September 1997.p.6-2-6-5.
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HSMST constant
heading

2
3
Radar max range + 10 nm
not to exceed 60 nm

4
Target of
Opportunity

1

1

Aircraft vectored to a maximum of 60 nm from the HSMST

2

Commence inbound run towards the 30-60 degree bow aspect to
determine maximum and minimum range

3

Aircraft to HSMST marine FM radio checks (channel 16 and 8)

4

VID of selected target

Figure 10. Depiction of Flight Test Part II, Directed Search Communications, and VID
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Table 3. Validation of Part II Data versus CRM
CRM

Data Compared from Part II with CRM Item for Validation

#
3

The maximum detection range determined from this test combined with
aircraft search speed can be used to analyze the time to clear 20,000 miles2 .

5

Test aircraft will maintain radio communication with range surveillance
during the entire test period; Any loss of communications will be noted.

6

The capability to communicate with the HSMST over marine band FM
frequencies will be demonstrated. Successfully directing a frequency switch
demonstrates the capability of communicating directions to targets.
A positive VID of a target of opportunity, or the HSMST will directly
validate this CRM item.

7
8

30-60 degrees off bow aspect is considered a reasonable representation of a 3
m2 RCS target.

9

The first detection of the HSMST will increase confidence in radar’s first
pass POD. If the aircraft is unable to detect the HSMST in a 30-60 degree off
bow aspect this may reduce confidence in its first pass detection capability.
Range surveillance can verify position reported either by direct correlation
with their own land based radar or post mission analysis with HSMST GPS
recorded data.
Radar performance will be validated up to wind/sea state conditions on day
of test.

10

14

Analysis of General Data
The test card for recording general aircraft data from Part I and II is presented in
appendix A, Figure 18. Table 4 describes the relation between general data gathered and
specific items of the CRM.

Summary
Table 5 presents a summary of the various requirements, which method was used to test
them, and the total number of times the requirement is evaluated. The proposed method
covers the all of the CRM items, with most items being evalua ted multiple times.
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Table 4. Validation of General Flight data versus CRM
CRM

General Data Compared with CRM Items for Validation

#
1
2
14

Taxi, takeoff and landing times can be compared to fuel expended to validate
endurance
Test aircraft will validate this CRM item by performing Part I and II tests at
a Vc of at least 150 KIAS
Dependent upon weather conditions on the day of test- Test aircraft should
demonstrate capability to operate in IMC conditions

Table 5. Summary of CRM Item Testing
CRM #
Preliminary
Requirements
Comparison
Preflight
Systems
Check
Flight Test
Part I
Flight Test
Part II
Flight Test
General
Analysis
Summary

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

X
X
X

X

X
X

X

X

10

11

12

X

13

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X
1

14

X

X

X
2

9

X

X
X

8

3

2

3

2
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1

3

3

X

X

X

3

2

2

2

3

CHAPTER IV. VALIDATION TEST RESULTS REPORTING
This section will describe the method by which the data are processed into a
suitable decision tool that the approval authority can use to determine if an aircraft and
radar system meets the requirements for range surveillance and clearance. This will take
the form of a report of validation test results, presented by the evaluating project test
engineer. The report will contain a synoptic scoring of the test aircraft versus the CRM, a
recommendation by the evaluator, as well as enclosures for the collected data. An
example of the report from this validation is presented in appendix B. The complete
package will be submitted for approval via the process explained in chapter III.
An example of the process to create a report of validation test results is provided
by application of the data from the flight test program of the C-130 AN/APS-115
modification effort23 . Where data are missing from the test program, notional numbers
have been substituted in order to complete the package. This example will explain the
process that results in the report of validation test results for range authorities’ review.

Decision Assessment Color Code
Although quantitative data are used to provide an objective assessment of test
results, a subjective method of analysis is also needed to support the assessment of these
data and rationalize the results. To that end the decision assessment color code (DACC),
as presented in Figure 11, will be used to make value judgment s relating to the acquired
test data and observations as they apply to the satisfaction of the requirements.

23

Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, “Evaluation of the APS-115 RADAR as Installed in the
KC-130F, For the Range Surveillance and Clearance Mission”, Report Number RSAT-2005-01-RTR, 30
JAN 2006.
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Requirement supported by data

5
4
3
2
1
1

2

3

4

5

Data confidence
Figure 11. Decision Assessment Color Code
The vertical axis is used to describe the degree to which the data support the
conclusion that a specific requirement of the CRM was satisfied. The numbers
correspond as follows:

1

2

3

4

5

Not supported

Somewhat

Supported

Strongly

Fully

supported

supported

supported

For example, if a requirement were laid out that an individual basketball player
make ten free throws in a row, a 5 on the vertical axis would indicate all ten were made.
If the player made four of ten free throws, a 2 would be indicated.
The horizontal axis represents the degree to which the evaluator has confidence
in the data produced. In our basketball example, if the player performed the free throws
outside on a windy day, a poor performance may be attributed to the conditions so the
confidence in the validity of the data would be low. On the other hand if the test were
repeated ten times on ten different days with a small variation in average result,
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confidence would be very high that the data accurately represents reality. The numbers of
the horizontal axis correspond as follows:

1

2

3

4

5

Not confident

Some

Confident

Very confident

Fully confident

confidence

The two axes are combined to provide a DACC for each category of the CRM.
The color code is assigned by the evaluating project test engineer. Green would indicate
that the aircraft met the particular criteria. Yellow indicates a medium level of capability
and may or may not need more investigation. For example, if a test were to be conducted
at the extreme range of the envelope with a large hazard pattern to clear, an aircraft that
scored a yellow in the endurance category might be disqualified, or might be qualified
with restrictions. That same aircraft may then be suitable for a near shore test with a
small hazard pattern. Red would indicate a serious deficiency either in performance
demonstrated or in the confidence of the data. In the later case, range authorities may
consider reevaluating the parameter in question to determine if a more favorable scoring
is appropriate.

Example of DACC Data Processing
When an DACC has been assigned to each category of the CRM, the project
engineer will condense them into one table as presented in Table 6. The coordinates of
each color will be included in an effort to provide the rationale behind the rating. This
table gives the approval authorit ies a visual means to support a decision which is data
driven and takes into account a qualitative assessment of the variables that may have
affected the test results. 24 The following paragraphs contain an explanation of how the
summary table presented was created.

24

Maarten W. Bos , Rick B. van Baaren, A. J. Dijksterhuis, and Loren F. Nordgren, “On Making the Right
Choice: The Deliberation-Without-Attention Effect”, Science, 17 February 2006, vol 311, p 1005-1007.
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Table 6. CRM versus DACC Summary
CRM
#

Validation
Method

Narrative

ACC

1

Flight
Test/Analysis

5,5

2

Flight
Test/Analysis

3

Preliminary
Requirements
Comparison/
Flight
Test/Analysis
Flight
Test/Analysis

C-130 Manuals support endurance of 10 + hrs submitted on data
sheet, Test aircraft used 4,800 lbs/hour during 3.2 hour mission
representative flight test which correlates to approximately 8.75
endurance with no internal tank installed (12.5 with internal tank).
C-130 easily meets requirement. Crew procedures indicate that
180 KIAS is the preferred search speed, however accelerations to
250 KIAS were demonstrated which are enhancing for
prosecuting targets at distance.
Using a 60 nm sweep width which is validated by the AREPS
model, and the maximum detection range demonstrated in test, the
C-130 could clear a 20,000miles 2 box in approximately 2 ¼ hours.
Further correlation of this is evidence by the sweep of a 1600 nm
test box with a complete surface plot calculated in 21 minutes.
C-130 navigated with negligible error to a predetermined search
area and accurately through the search course defined.
Consistently navigated well within ±0.5 nm accuracy required.
The C-130 as tested, utilized, dual INS systems with embedded
GPS. Additionally, although less accurate, dual TACAN/VOR
could be used.
Dual UHF/VHF demonstrated in the ground. During flight test
aircraft maintained dual frequency communication with range
surveillance and air traffic control throughout test period. No
problems noted.
C-130 did not have organic marine band capability. Workaround
utilized hand held ICOM radios which were demonstrated on the
ground up to all required frequencies. Because the handhelds are
broadcast through the glass of the flight station they performed
poorly when the HSMST was at the stern of the aircraft. Radios
are workable but with some loss of communications capability.
During test the C-130 descended to 500 ft and identified a target
of opportunity. The aircraft was identified by name, type, and
characteristics as well as estimated course and speed. Additionally
C-130 aircraft are used by the U.S. Coast Guard as a search an
rescue asset, a mission which requires VID, and therefore can be
considered previously certified by a government agency for VID.
AREPS simulation suggests target acquisition out to ˜22nm. In

4

5

6

Preflight
Systems
Check/Flight
Test
Preflight
Systems
Check/Flight
Test

7

Flight Test

8

Preliminary
Requirements
Comparison/
Flight Test
Preliminary
Requirements
Comparison/
Flight Test

9

practice the HSMST was detected multiple times during flight test out to
50 nm. Data confidence lowered due to poor correlation between HSMST
and specified target RCS.

AREPS simulation supports this conclusion. C-130 detected the
HSMST on first pass during two different tests. Data confidence
lowered due to poor correlation between HSMST and specified target
RCS, and limited number of test passes.
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5,5
4,4

4,5

5,5
4,3

4,5

3,4
3,4

Table 6 Continued
CRM
#

Validation
Method

10

Flight Test,
Analysis

11

Flight Test,
Analysis

12

Flight Test,
Analysis

13

Preflight
Systems
Check/Flight
Test
Flight Test,
Analysis

14

Narrative

ACC

C-130 performed an airborne calibration test against fixed target
of known position (Begg rock) and accurately identified
multiple targets of opportunity and the HSMST during the entire
flight test. The accuracy level of ±0.5 nm could not be proved at
longer ranges due to beam width variation however, the radar
performance was more than adequate to determine if a target
would foul the hazard pattern.
C-130 multiple times presented accurate target course (±5
degrees) data both for targets of opportunity and the HSMST.
The radar determined course was compared real time with
ground tracking stations as well as post mission with HSMST
GPS data.
C-130 multiple times presented accurate target speed (±3 knots)
data both for targets of opportunity and the HSMST. The radar
determined course was compared real time with ground tracking
stations as well as post mission with HSMST GPS data.
AN/APS-115 able to process multiple contacts according to
manufacturers specs. Radar operator demonstrated system
during ground test. During flight test C-130, successfully
tracked 5 targets (HSMST and 4 targets of opportunity).
C-130 is a proven all weather aircraft. System performed well
with the following ambient conditions. Surface winds (average 9
knots) and Sea State estimated at 3 Beaufort scale.

4,4

4,4

4,4
4,5
3,4

Endurance(CRM # 1)
Endurance can be calculated from aircraft publications. However, flight test is
useful in determining the validity of the published endurance charts as compared to
mission representative operations. The actual search speed, fuel expended during climbs
and descents, as well as speed changes during VID can not be accurately interpolated by
use of aircraft performance charts alone. Therefore flight test correlation is a valuable
tool for enhancing confidence in the endurance predictions made of the proposed aircraft.

Cruise Airspeed (CRM # 2)
Cruise airspeed is one of the easier parameters to check. Virtually all proposed
aircraft will have some established history regarding maximum, minimum and endurance
airspeeds and this CRM can probably be determined with high confidence prior to flight.
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However, if a question exists, the flight test can be used to validate speed by monitoring
the average search speed from the RSC, or onboard evaluator as applicable.

Search Speed (CRM #3)
The degree to which an aircraft meets this requirement is dependent on the
maximum range of the radar and the aircraft search speed. The raw data from the C-130
aircraft test indicate that the maximum range for detecting the HSMST was 50 nm. As
will be explained in a later paragraph, the AREPS model predicted approximately a 22
nm maximum range. A 30 nm range was assumed as a middle ground between the two
maximum ranges and was chosen for both simplicity and to err on the conservative side.
Using a search speed of 180 KIAS and the example 20,000 miles2 search area from
Figure 3, the following assumptions and calculations were made. A 30 nm maximum
range could be used to determine a sweep width of 60 nm. This is supported both by the
AREPS model and well within the range demonstrated by flight test. A 60 nm sweep with
would require 3 track runs of the proposed box. That would require covering a total
distance of no more than 400 nm which under no wind would equate to 2 ¼ hours to
cover the entire 20,000 miles2 . Figure 12 is a visual presentation of the search path
described. The time to create a surface plot of the 1600 mi2 test area in the Part I flight
test can be used as order of magnitude supporting evidence.

Navigation(CRM #4)
Modern aircraft almost universally incorporate GPS technology for very accurate
navigation and as such this criterion of the CRM, although important, is not expected to
produce many failures. Flight test Part I will confirm capability of aircraft (and aircrew)
to navigate with precision to a predetermined start point. The data package may comment
on type of systems incorporated and number and quality of redundant systems.
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Sweep Width
W=60nm

˜142 nm

.

Figure 12. Search Area Determination Rationale

Communications(CRM# 5 and 6)
Communications are assessed primarily through qualitative evaluation. The radios
will be checked during preflight systems check for functionality as well as frequency
range covered. Comments can also be made on quality and number of radios employed.

Visual Identification (VID) (CRM # 7)
This criterion could be considered more of a crew capability requirement than an
aircraft capability. The validation supports the mission capability.

Radar Detection (CRM # 8-9)
Compliance with these CRM criteria are modeled through the AREPS computer program,
and validated through flight test. Figure 13 and Figure 14 are the AREPS prediction of
the AN/APS-115 radar versus a 3 m2 RCS target. The two graphs are to account for two

33

Figure 13. AN/APS-115 Short Pulse Mode versus 3m2 RCS Target

Figure 14. AN/APS-115 Long Pulse Mode versus 3 m2 RCS Target
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different operating modes (short and long pulse respectively) of the radar. The operator
can switch back and forth between modes as deemed necessary to present the best surface
picture. Both modes predicted similar results for the small target. Actual flight test results
extended the range out to 50 nm. There are many reasons for a discrepancy in the data,
the most significant being that the HSMST is not a uniformly distributed 3 m2 RCS
target. Further, even a uniformly distributed target would vary based on motion sea state,
forward motion of the boat and the wake it creates.

Target Accuracy (CRM #10)
Flight test data gathered can be compared real time and during post mission
analysis to determine the accuracy of radar. The accuracy level described by the CRM is
extremely difficult to prove because of the inherent error in recording locations, aircraft
position.

Radar Processing (CRM # 11-12)
As the radar operator tracks various contacts over time, a solution for speed and
course can be determined. Some radar systems will automatically solve for this product
while others rely on the operator to manually solve for the course speed. The radar
operator’s solutions can be compared both real time and during post mission analysis to
determine accuracy of the track. The most useful data is the track of the HSMST which is
a target of the smallest expected type and is controlled in that its speed and course can be
commanded by the test operations conductor and are recorded on its onboard GPS
system.

Radar Processing (CRM # 13)
The capability to label and maintain multiple contacts is a system specific issue
which can be demonstrated to the project test engineer during the preflight systems
check, and proven during the first part of flight test when the surface plot is created.
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Weather/Surface Conditions(CRM#14)
This criterion is not a controlled parameter and is limited to the conditions on the
day of the test. Evaluators can analyze aircraft based on historical performance as well as
document performance as tested.

Summary
The elements described above will be compiled into one table and submitted with
data input sheets, supporting data, and preflight systems check and flight test cards. The
synoptic summary will be the archival record which can be referenced and used as a
starting point for further tests as necessary.
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions
In the opinion of the author, it is possible to develop a single generic method to
validate a proposed aircraft for the range surveillance and clearance mission. Because no
standardized method currently exists to provide this type of validation, the method
proposed is an improvement over the existing approval system. The proposed method
presents a standardized means for qualifying an aircraft for the range surveillance and
clearance mission. Additionally, the report of validation test results provides a resource
by which an approval authority can confidently accept an aircraft for use in this mission,
and one which can be archived for later reference.
However, during this conduct of this study, the following limitations were
discovered that can affect the results of this process.
1. Target detection is limited to test day environmental conditions which could
potentially skew results.
2. The HSMST can only be reliably characterized in terms of radar cross section
from specific angles and with no motion. Depending on the atmospherics and sea state,
capable radars may be unable to detect the HSMST or substandard radars may show
better than expected performance.
3. Performance of an aircraft radar system is highly dependent on capable and highly
trained operators. Poor test results may be attributed to poor system operator
performance.
4. Existing range clearance instructions contain requirements that are designed for
very large test hazard patterns. These requirements have the effect of excluding aircraft
which would be very suitable for the more typical range clearance missions that cover on
the order of 1/20th the 20,000 miles2 detailed in the CRM.
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Recommendations
The Navy’s national range authority, NAVAIR 5.2 should consider creating a
standardized policy to include the approved method for validating range surveillance and
clearance aircraft as described in this paper. The instruction should clearly define
organizational roles and responsibilities as well as the reporting criteria, signature
authority, and archiving instructions.
A study should be conducted to investigate ways to mitigate some of the limiting
factors of the test method proposed by this thesis. For example, a restriction that places
limits on test day sea state and weather conditions could improve the accuracy of the
assessment of radar performance. Another example would be a requirement that the radar
operator of the candidate system have current experience in the surface surveillance
environment; preferably with the system under test. Lastly, a revision of the requirements
should be considered to reflect the typical test patterns which do not require searching
large areas. This would allow for the consideration of assets with lesser endurance but
capable radar systems such as Navy helicopters.
Additionally, the author recommend s the study of a future improvement to this
proposed method which would create a database of potential range surveillance and
clearance aircraft. Query logic could be incorporated whic h would ask for the parameters
of a specific mission (area of the hazard pattern, time of event etc.). Using these
parameters the data base could provide a list of all the aircraft types suitable for the
mission. The Range Commander or operations conductor could then select the most
appropriate option based on cost versus performance or availability.
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APPENDIX A. TEST DATA CARDS
Preflight Systems Check Data Card
Date:

Evaluator:

Aircraft/System Under

Control Number:

Test
Evaluate the

v When

Following

Complete

Data Required :

Comments: Make qualitative
comments as necessary

Turn radar system
on, observe BIT
checks if applicable

Note clock time system

Observe operator
performing normal
procedures to make
system ready for
use.

Note clock time system

turned on:_________

is ready for
use:_________

None
Conduct system
familiarization for
evaluator.
* Note: Prior to radiating for ground test, ensure ground personnel and equipment are at the
minimum required distance for the system being tested
Observe all
selectable radar
modes, scan rates.
Secure radar when
complete.
Radio checks. At a
minimum check
primary, backup
range surveillance
frequency and
VHF/FM marine
channel 16 and 8
Other?:

This system has
displayed adequate
performance to proceed
to flight test:

None

___________________________________________________________
Evaluator Signature

Figure 15. Preflight Systems Check Data Card
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Part I Flight Test Data Card
Autonomous Search Surface Plot
Performing parallel
search pattern defined
by
REPORT ALL
CONTACTS TO
RANGE
SURVEILLANCE
Contact Time

Latitude

Longitude

__°__._ N
__°__._ N
__°__._ N
__°__._ N

__°__._ W
__°__._ W
__°__._ W
__°__._ W

Time to complete surface
plot
Record clock time
Commenced:___________
Completed:_____________

Contact Time

Position
(range/bearing)

Position
(range/bearing)

Course/Speed

Course/Speed

Designation

Designation

Contact Time

Contact Time

Position
(range/bearing)

Position
(range/bearing)

Course/Speed

Course/Speed

Designation

Designation

Contact Time

Contact Time

Position
(range/bearing)

Position
(range/bearing)

Course/Speed

Course/Speed

Designation

Designation
Figure 16. Part I Flight Test Data Card
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Part II Flight Test Data Card
Directed Search
Max/Min radar
detection

Data Required

Report/record first detection of
HSMST

Time:______________
Range:_____________
Bearing:____________

Report/record continuous
HSMST radar return

Time:______________

Comments

Report/record loss of contact at Time:______________
min range
Range:_____________
Bearing:____________
COMMUNICATIONS TEST
Establish communications with
HSMST on FM Channel 16

Report clarity in terms of
loud and clear from 0-5

Switch HSMST to FM
Channel 8
Once data recorded, comm test
complete

Report clarity in terms of
loud and clear from 0-5

VID contact

When directed, proceed to
contact designated by range
surveillance and descend VMC
to VID target

Vessels
Name:_____________
Estimated course/speed:
________________________

Vessel Type (circle):
Merchant

Fishing

Sailboat

Powerboat

Notes on contact characteristics:

Figure 17. Part II Flight Test Data Card
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General Flight Test Data Card
Date:

Evaluator:

Aircraft/System
Under Test

HSMST Call
Sign

Range Control Frequencies
Primary___________
Backup_______________

Control Number:

ATIS__________
Runway in Use___________
Reported Winds/Temperature

General:

Mission Notes:

Takeoff, when ATC hands off to
range control, climb to 5,000 ft
MSL and proceed to search area.
Search Track begins at:
Latitude______________________
Longitude_____________________

Procedure

Data Required

Start Up

Note Time:
Fuel Onboard:

Takeoff

Note Time

Enroute

Note: Sea State:

Landing

Note Time:

Shutdown

Note Time:
Note Fuel onboard

Comments

Figure 18. General Test Flight Data Card
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APPENDIX B. EXAMPLE REPORT OF VALIDATION TEST
RESULTS
Date
From: Gish, J.G. Project Engineer 521100E
To: Appropriate Final Authority Name Title
Ref: (a) NAVAIR 5.2 INST XXXX.X
Encl: (1) Input Data Sheet (Control Number XXXX)
(2) Supporting Data
(3) Ground and Flight Test Cards
Subj: REPORT OF VALIDATION TEST RESULTS OF THE NC-130F, FOR THE
RANGE SURVEILLANCE AND CLEARANCE MISSION
1. Between (x-x Days Month Year), analysis, ground and flight test were performed to
determine the suitability of the NC-130F (Bureau Number 168563) to perform the range
surveillance and clearance mission. Specifically the aircraft and system were tested to
determine compliance with the capabilities requirements delineated in reference (a).
Table 1 is a summary of the findings.
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Table A 1. Summary Findings
CRM
#

Validation
Method

Narrative

ACC

1

Flight
Test/Analysis

5,5

2

Flight
Test/Analysis

3

Preliminary
Requirements
Comparison/
Flight
Test/Analysis
Flight
Test/Analysis

C-130 Manuals support endurance of 10 + hrs submitted on data
sheet, Test aircraft used 4,800 lbs/hour during 3.2 hour mission
representative flight test which correlates to approximately 8.75
endurance with no internal tank installed (12.5 with internal tank).
C-130 easily meets requirement. Crew procedures indicate that
180 KIAS is the preferred search speed, however accelerations to
250 KIAS were demonstrated which are enhancing for
prosecuting targets at distance.
Using a 60 nm sweep width which is validated by the AREPS
model, and the maximum detection range demonstrated in test, the
C-130 could clear a 20,000miles 2 box in approximately 2 ¼ hours.
Further correlation of this is evidence by the sweep of a 1600 nm
test box with a complete surface plot calculated in 21 minutes.
C-130 navigated with negligible error to a predetermined search
area and accurately through the search course defined.
Consistently navigated well within ±0.5 nm accuracy required.
The C-130 as tested, utilized, dual INS systems with embedded
GPS. Additionally, although less accurate, dual TACAN/VOR
could be used.
Dual UHF/VHF demonstrated in the ground. During flight test
aircraft maintained dual frequency communication with range
surveillance and air traffic control throughout test period. No
problems noted.
C-130 did not have organic marine band capability. Workaround
utilized hand held ICOM radios which were demonstrated on the
ground up to all required frequencies. Because the handhelds are
broadcast through the glass of the flight station they performed
poorly when the HSMST was at the stern of the aircraft. Radios
are workable but with some loss of communications capability.
During test the C-130 descended to 500 ft and identified a target
of opportunity. The aircraft was identified by name, type, and
characteristics as well as estimated course and speed. Additionally
C-130 aircraft are used by the U.S. Coast Guard as a search an
rescue asset, a mission which requires VID, and therefore can be
considered previously certified by a government agency for VID.
AREPS simulation suggests target acquisition out to ˜22nm. In

4

5

6

Preflight
Systems
Check/Flight
Test
Preflight
Systems
Check/Flight
Test

7

Flight Test

8

Preliminary
Requirements
Comparison/
Flight Test
Preliminary
Requirements
Comparison/
Flight Test

9

practice the HSMST was detected multiple times during flight test out to
50 nm. Data confidence lowered due to poor correlation between HSMST
and specified target RCS.

AREPS simulation supports this conclusion. C-130 detected the
HSMST on first pass during two different tests. Data confidence
lowered due to poor correlation between HSMST and specified target
RCS, and limited number of test passes.
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5,5
4,4

4,5

5,5
4,3

4,5

3,4
3,4

Table A 1 Continued

CRM
#

Validation
Method

10

Flight Test,
Analysis

11

Flight Test,
Analysis

12

Flight Test,
Analysis

13

Preflight
Systems
Check/Flight
Test
Flight Test,
Analysis

14

Narrative

ACC

C-130 performed an airborne calibration test against fixed target
of known position (Begg rock) and accurately identified multiple
targets of opportunity and the HSMST during the entire flight
test. The accuracy level of ±0.5 nm could not be proved at longer
ranges due to beam width variation however, the radar
performance was more than adequate to determine if a target
would foul the hazard pattern.
C-130 multiple times presented accurate target course (±5
degrees) data both for targets of opportunity and the HSMST. The
radar determined course was compared real time with ground
tracking stations as well as post mission with HSMST GPS data.
C-130 multiple times presented accurate target speed (±3 knots)
data both for targets of opportunity and the HSMST. The radar
determined course was compared real time with ground tracking
stations as well as post mission with HSMST GPS data.
AN/APS-115 able to process multiple contacts according to
manufacturers specs. Radar operator demonstrated system during
ground test. During flight test C-130, successfully tracked 5
targets (HSMST and 4 targets of opportunity).
C-130 is a proven all weather aircraft. System performed well
with the following ambient conditions. Surface winds (average 9
knots) and Sea State estimated at 3 Beaufort scale.

4,4

4,4
4,4
4,5
3,4

2. As project engineer for this test I was impressed with the AN/APS-115 radar’s overall
performance, as installed in the C-130. I recommend approval of the NC-130F as a range
surveillance and clearance asset with no restrictions.
________________________
signature
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